That case involved a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which gave the State of Maine permitting authority, under the Clean Water Act and MICSA, with regard to discharge of pollutants into territorial waters of the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe, but exempted two Tribal-owned facilities from the State's permitting program. Despite a detailed Opinion Letter from the U.S. Department of the Interior supporting the Tribe's claims, the court upheld the State’s authority to regulate all of the disputed sites, including the two tribal-owned sites located on tribal lands which the EPA had found to have insignificant consequences for non-members of the tribes.
Former employees of the Micmacs filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging violations of their rights under state law. In response, the Micmacs contended that they possess inherent sovereign rights to control their internal tribal matters. According to the Tribe, employment decisions are a function of tribal government not subject to state regulation. The First Circuit concurred with the State’s argument that MICSA 25 USCS §1725(a) applies to the Micmacs.
In 1982, the Penobscot Nation filed for injunctive relief asserting in part that MIA Section 6206(1) protects against State interference in internal tribal matters. The Court rejected the Penobscot Nation argument. As a result, the State view that the Penobscot Nation beano operation was subject to State law under 30 MRSA §6204 prevailed.
In this foundational case that paved the way for the Maine Indian Land Claims, the federal Court of Appeals rejected the State’s constricted view of the legal status of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and affirmed that the United States government had always had a trust responsibility to the Tribe. After the Morton decision, and prior to the 1980 Settlement, the federal government belatedly extended federal recognition to the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation.
This MITSC News item describes the US Supreme Court's denial of review in the Penobscot v. Frey. As a result, the en banc decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals remained the final decision on the merits in the Penobscot River litigation.
Click here to read the Penobscot Nation’s Reply Brief.
The State of Maine filed a reply to the Penobscot Nation’s and US Solicitor General’s petitions for a writ of certiorari seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court of the en banc decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Penobscot Nation v. Frey. To read the State’s reply click here.
This is the Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the US Supreme Court by MITSC in support of the appeals by the Penobscot Nation and the United States in the Penobscot River case. The brief was supported unanimously by the State and Tribal Commission members.
This is the decision by the full (en banc) US First Circuit Court of Appeals that stands as the final court decision because the US Supreme Court declined to review it.
In this state court appellate decision the court held that tribal jurisdiction does not disappear simply because a person who is not a member of the Tribe is involved in a dispute, especially when the action is against the Tribe and a tribal member concerning tribal land. The court stated that the tribal court was the appropriate forum to hear the case.
This is the decision by US District Judge George Singal in the lower federal court in the Penobscot River litigation. This decision was appealed to the US Court of Appeals.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that state courts had no jurisdiction over a dispute between a tribal member and a tribal housing authority because it was an internal tribal matter under the Maine Implementing Act.
Former employees of the Maliseets filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging violations of their rights under state law. In response, the Maliseets contended that they possess inherent sovereign rights to control their internal tribal matters. According to the Tribe, employment decisions are a function of tribal government not subject to state regulation. The First Circuit concurred with the State’s argument that MICSA 25 USCS §1725(a) applies to the Maliseets.
In a dispute between a tribal member and a tribal housing authority in which the tribe was not a party the court held that any party can raise the issue of whether a dispute is an internal tribal matter over which state courts do not have jurisdiction. The court also held that the Tribe as a sovereign entity should be permitted to participate in the case to develop evidence and inform the court regarding whether the dispute was an internal tribal matter.
A newspaper brought this action under the state Freedom of Access Act seeking Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Reservation documents concerning a proposed liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. The state court held that the state Freedom of Access Act did not apply because the Tribes' conduct in entering into a commercial lease is more like the profit-making activity of a business corporation than the governmental activity of a municipality.
Three paper corporations sued the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe seeking documents under the Maine Freedom of Access Act. The Court had to decide whether the Maine Freedom of Access Act, 1 M.R.S.A. §§ 401-410 (1989 & Supp. 2000), which is ordinarily applicable to municipalities and other components of state government, is applicable to the Penobscot Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe. The Court found that when the Tribes are engaged in the deliberative processes of self-governance, the Maine Freedom of Access Act does not apply due to 30 MRSA §6206(1). Conversely, the Court decided when the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Nation act in their municipal capacity “with persons or entities other than their tribal membership, such as the state or federal government, the Tribes may be engaged in matters that are not ‘internal tribal matters.’”
Fellencer was an employment case where the Maine Superior Court ruled that employment matters did not fall under the internal tribal matters provisions of the MIA. On January 19, 1999, Fellencer was reversed on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, and the case was remanded for the entry of judgment (reversed) in favor of the Penobscot Indian Nation.
Thirteen Passamaquoddy fishers were charged with harvesting marine resources without a license and other offenses. The Passamaquoddy Tribe hired an attorney to defend the Passamaquoddy fishers charged in June of 1997 and the 13 cases were joined into one: State v. Beal. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Passamaquoddy Tribe fishers. That motion to dismiss was rejected by District Court Judge John Romei.
This federal case involved a dispute between a Penobscot tribal member and the Penobscot Nation regarding permits for timber harvesting on Penobscot tribal lands. The court held that the dispute was an "internal tribal matter " under the Maine Implementing Act and the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiff's claims.
In Boyce, the defendants appealed from an order of the superior court granting the Band's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the defendants contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin the defendants from interfering with tribal business and to order Katahdin Trust Co., the Band's bank, to disburse funds to the tribal council without liability.
In 1996, the Passamaquoddy Tribe brought suit against the State of Maine on gaming (Passamaquoddy v. State of Maine 75 F.3d 784 (1996)) (Addendum 8). The Tribe argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (enacted after Stilphen and in the wake of Cabazon) opened the door for Tribal gaming in Maine and compelled the State to compact with the Tribe. The Court found that section 1735(b) was a valid "savings clause" that precluded application of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in Maine unless Congress specifically made it applicable in Maine. The Court concluded that the text of IGRA gave no indication that Congress intended to make that Act specifically applicable within Maine.
In this important pre-Settlement decision the Maine Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the State of Maine had no criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for alleged criminal offenses on their Reservations.
In this pre-Settlement decision the federal court confirmed that the Tribe retained the full attributes of tribal sovereignty as defined by Federal Indian Law.
In this landmark case Judge Edward Gignoux held that the Indian Nonintercourse Act is applicable to the Passamaquoddy Indian Tribe; that the Act establishes a trust relationship between the United States and the Tribe; and that defendants could not deny plaintiffs' request for litigation in their behalf on the sole ground that there is no trust relationship between the United States and the Tribe.
In this 19th century case the state court incorrectly held that hunting by tribal members on tribal lands was completely controlled by State law, and that tribal members no longer had treaty-based hunting and fishing rights.
This 19th century case dramatically demonstrates how Maine courts endorsed the State of Maine's assertion of pervasive control over the Wabanaki Tribes in violation of the basic principles of federal Indian law.
This Executive Order was issued by former Governor LePage to require state agencies to develop to engage with Tribal governments at the earliest possible juncture regarding regarding any legislation, rules, and policies proposed by the State agencies on matters that significantly or uniquely affect the Tribes. The Executive Order was never meaningfully implemented and was subsequently rescinded by Governor LePage.
This is the non-binding Joint Resolution by the Maine Legislature that expresses support for the UN Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples. MITSC and others continue to urge the State of Maine to apply the principles of the UN Declaration in the State's relationships with the Wabanaki Tribes.
This report presents archival research on and analysis of the drafting of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA), a federal law enacted in October 1980 to settle land claims brought by the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Indian Nation.
This is the extensive record that was created in the US District Court in the Penobscot River litigation.
In this letter and accompanying Attorney General Opinion the State asserted that the Penobscot Reservation includes only the islands in the main stem of the river and not the river itself, and that the Penobscot Nation has no regulatory authority or proprietary control over the river. This letter triggered the extensive litigation that culminated in the decision in Penobscot Nation v. Frey.
This is one of several state court decisions in the 19th century that endorsed the State's assertion that the Wabanaki Tribes were under the jurisdiction and guardianship of the State.
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